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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of specific airline business decisions on aircraft
accident propensity. Airline safety affects everyone and has large regulatory and policy
implications. Existing research has focused largely on three areas: airline financial health, safety
and the resulting effects of accidents. I use both Poisson and Negative Binomial models to study
two different airline features: low-cost carriers and flight length, and how they relate to the
probability of an aircraft accident. Based on results using a Generalized Negative Binomial
model, I find statistically significant evidence at the 99% confidence level that a 1-unit increase
in the flight length leads to a 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents. I also find statistically
significant evidence at the 99% confidence level that when an airline is classified as a low-cost
carrier, the number of accidents decreases by 79.16%. These results indicate that a homogenous
safety regulation framework is not appropriate for the airline industry with regard to flight length
and cost structure.
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I.

Introduction
This paper investigates the following two questions: Do budget or low-cost airlines have

more aircraft accidents than their counterparts of legacy carriers? Do airlines that provide longer
average flight routes have more airplane accidents than their counterparts?
Intuitively, it may be expected that budget airlines only take the minimum safety
precautions in order to provide the same services as their counterparts for a lower cost. Thus, an
airline classified as a budget airline may have more accidents than a non-budget airline as a
result of less investment in safety. Alternately, budget airlines may spend more on safety in order
to preserve their reputation and thus experience fewer accidents than their counterparts. A longer
flight length may cause an increase in the number of accidents because the more time an aircraft
is in the air, the more time there is for an accident to occur. Conversely, if the probability of an
accident occurring is greatest during taxiing, takeoff and landing, operators who service shorthaul flights may experience more accidents as they rely on quick turnaround times and incur a
larger number of takeoffs and landings.
Existing research relating to these topics focuses on the subsequent effects of airplane
accidents, the effect of an airline company’s financial health on safety and the ways in which
airlines make business decisions. The Poisson model for discrete independent variables is used
consistently throughout the research related to accident rates. Using this model, existing research
has found contradicting evidence on the statistical significance between financial health and
safety (Wang, Hofer and Dresner, 2013; Rose, 1990; Golbe, 1986).
This paper closes the gap in existing research between business decisions and safety as I
investigate the effect of business decisions, specifically whether or not the airline is a budget
airline and flight routes, on accident rates. I make use of count models, specifically Poisson and

71

Negative Binomial, to answer my questions of interest because my dependent variable, number
of accidents, is a positive count variable. While there is an abundant amount of existing research
which uses the Poisson model and number of accidents as a dependent variable, no other
research has combined these things with independent variables which relate specifically to
deliberate business decisions such as flight length and whether or not an airline is a budget
airline. Applying the Generalized Negative Binomial model closes a gap in existing research
while also generalizing my conclusions by eliminating the assumption that the variance of my
dependent variable is linear and equal to the mean.
This topic is important because it relates to issues of safety, transportation routes and
business efficiency. Understanding the connection between a firm’s decision making incentives
and the frequency of accidents can help to prevent airplane accidents in the future through more
effective regulation and improved business efficiency. Airlines adapt to changing economic
environments while continuously aiming to maximize profits. Recognizing these decisions in
relation to accident frequency may help businesses to understand the results of their actions and
thus, change them accordingly to increase safety.
These research questions address issues of public policy and customer awareness, both
nationally and internationally. The potential risks associated with flying are large and affect
many more individuals than just those who fly. It is important for both consumers and the public
to recognize the risks associated with flying, particularly if the risk is not uniform across airlines
or flight routes. The results might help to determine if a universal regulatory framework for all
types of airlines is the best form of safety-related policy.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, I review related literature, important
variables and common models used to answer similar questions. In section III, I outline the
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Poisson and Negative Binomial models, my hypotheses and describe my research method. In
section IV, I discuss the data and define each variable. In section V, I present the empirical
results of my research. In section VI, I conclude my analysis with the implications and
applicability of my results.

II.

Literature Review
Existing research related to the effects of airline business decisions on aircraft accidents

falls into two categories. A first line of this research focuses on safety as it relates to profits,
financial health, investment and demand. A second line of this research studies business
decisions as they relate to both topics of low cost competition and flight routes. My research
provides a link between the existing yet isolated research on business decisions and safety.
First I discuss existing research relating to safety, and accidents in particular. A useful
study is conducted by Golbe (1986), who examines the relationship between profits and safety
precautions taken by an individual airline. She implements both cross-sectional and time-series
techniques on data of U.S. airlines aggregated at the industry level from 1952 – 1972. Golbe
(1986) emphasizes key variables of number of departures, load factors and net income, as a
measure of profitability. Golbe (1986) uses airline accident experience as a measure of safety
and models both accident experience and net income as dependent variables. Her research
concludes that there is no significant relationship between profits and safety (Golbe 1986).
Bornstein and Zimmerman (1988) investigate the effect of an aircraft accident on flight
demand using time series data for U.S. air carriers from 1960 - 1985, modeling revenue per
passenger as a function of elapsed time since an accident, seasonal dummies, and firm and time
fixed effects. They conclude that although an accident results in a significant $4.5 million loss
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for a firm, there is not a significant relationship between accidents and flight demand before
deregulation of the industry and only weak evidence of an effect on demand after deregulation
(Bornstein and Zimmerman 1988).
Rose (1990) studies the effect of an airlines’ financial health on accident rates using panel
data across thirty-five U.S. airlines from 1957 - 1986. She measures safety as a risk distribution,
gathering data on both safety investment and physical conditions in which firms operate their
aircraft. Similar to Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013), Rose (1990) uses the Poisson probability
distribution to model the dependent variable of accident rate. Using fixed effects, Rose (1990)
separately models both total accidents and fatal accidents as an effect of departures (system
departures in thousands), average stage length (thousands of miles), carrier type, foreign flights,
size of firm, airline operating experience (billions of miles) and time variant characteristics of
technology. While I use some of the same variables, all of my models use only total accidents as
the dependent variable. She concludes that an increase in operator profit leads to a statistically
significant decrease in accident rates (Rose 1990).
Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) measure the effect of safety investment on accident
propensity and financial health. They use panel data on airlines from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) from 1991 – 2008. Due
to the entry and exit of airlines within the industry, they treat their panel dataset as unbalance.
These authors model Poisson functions of number of accidents as I will do in this paper. Further,
they create a variable for average accidents per departure, substituting this as the dependent
variable in their reduced form model. They conclude that safety investment reduces accident
propensity and find no relationship between financial condition and accident propensity nor
financial condition and safety investment (Wang, Hofer and Dresner 2013).
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Other pertinent research emphasizes airline business decisions in relation to budget
airlines and flight routes. Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) examine the relationship between lowcost operator presence at airports and average airfare. They use the DOT’s form 41 for Air
Carrier Traffic Statistics to crease a time-series data consisting of the four quarters of 1996. They
use a cross section regression model in which the dependent variable is average yield
(price/distance) with independent variables including total passengers, distances (stage length)
and ValueJet. They measure ValueJet as a binary variable valued at 1 if the airline ValueJet
services a particular airport and 0 otherwise; this variable accounts for the presence of low cost
carriers at any given airport. Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) conclude that the presence of lowcost competition for a particular route has a statistically significant negative effect on revenue.
Garrow, Holte and Mumbower (2012) study the phenomenon of product de-bundling as it
relates to the emergence of low-cost carriers. They collect airline data from individual airline
websites regarding baggage fees, cancelation fees, seat fees and ticket change fees. They find
statistically significant evidence that low-cost carriers are the most likely carriers to charge
additional fees.
Gillen and Hazledine (2015) study the effect of regional route fluctuations on firm
pricing strategy. They use data from a total of six regions on various flight routes and use the
Hirschman-Herfindahl index to account for airline concentration. They find no significant
relationship between supply of seats and route length but find a significant difference in airfares
across regions (Gillen and Hazledine 2015).
The limitation of prior research addressed in this paper is the lack of research examining
the cause of accidents as related to business decisions. Although there is abundant research on
airline safety and business decisions relating to budget airlines and flight routes, these topics
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have only been studied in isolation from each other. Current research focuses on the effects of
accidents but little has been examined regarding the cause of the accidents. My research utilizes
many of the same variables, models and tests as those introduced above but I investigate the link
between these industry characteristics and accidents to determine the effect of both flight length
and budget airlines on accidents.

III.

Model and Methodology
I test whether budget airlines have more accidents than their counterparts and whether an

increase in flight length leads to an increase in the number of aircraft accidents using a unified
model. I hypothesize that budget airlines have more accidents than their counterparts as budget
airlines may cut safety costs in order to provide cheaper fares than legacy or non-budget airlines.
I expect an increase in flight length to cause a decrease in the number of accidents as I suspect
that operators who provide long-haul flights invest more in safety and experience fewer takeoffs
and landings, which are most damaging to the engines and aircraft, than operators who provide
more frequent short-haul services.
I use a unified Negative Binomial model to answer my two questions of interest because
of the similarity in potential control variables. I have included control variables which intuitively
affect aircraft accidents without being directly related to flight length or whether or not an airline
is a budget airline.
Similar to previous research such as that of Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) and Rose
(1990), I begin by using the Poisson model to estimate the relationship between flight distance,
budget airlines and accidents. The Poisson model is applicable to this data set because the
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dependent variable, aircraft accidents, is a count variable. This model requires the dependent
variable to be a discrete, non-negative value including zero, which is true of aircraft accidents.
As the number of accidents may equal zero for any given year, we cannot take the log of
the dependent variable. Instead, I use the following exponential function:
E(y|x1, x2, …, xk) = exp(ߚ 0 + ߚ 1x1 + … + ߚ kxk) =

(1)

exp(Xitߚ)
Where xit represents various independent or control variables for airline i at time t while ߚ
represents corresponding estimated coefficients. However, with the Poisson model, equation 1
can be simplified because the distribution is determined by the mean; in fact, the mean and
variance of Y are equal in the Poisson model. This is represented in the following equation:
P(Yit) = (exp[-exp(xitߚ)][ሺݔ௧ ߚሻ ] / Y!

(2)

Where P(Yit) is the probability of Y accidents for airline i at time t, exp(xitߚ) is the expected
number of accidents for airline i at time t or the average accident rate per departure and Y = 0, 1,
2, …, exp(xitߚ) > 0.
Further, in the Poisson model, the mean and the variance are equal. This is represented in
the following equation:
E(Yit) = exp(xitߚ) = Var(Yit)

(3)

However due to the nature of accident rates, there may be more or less variation in the
data than expected under Poisson. Thus, the Negative Binomial model may provide a better fit
for the relationship of interest as the Poisson model may produce biased coefficient estimates in
the presence of over- or under-dispersion (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995).8 As shown

8

As stated by Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995), “It is well known, based on the finding
of many previous research efforts, that accident frequency data tend to be over-dispersed, with
the variance being significantly greater than the mean” (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995).
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by Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995), who study the effect of roadway accidents using the
Negative Binomial model, equation 3 can be altered to represent the relationship with a Negative
Binomial model in the following way:
Var(Yit) = E(Yit)[1+ ߙE(Yit)]

(4)

From the above equation, the variance is no longer equal to the mean when using the
Negative Binomial model due to the existence of the term [1 + ߙE(Y)], when ߙE(Y) ≠ 0. When
ߙ is equal to 0, Var(Y) = E(Y) and I am left with variance which is represented in the Poisson
model. However, when ߙ is not equal to zero, there is evidence of either over - or underdispersion. It is important to note that the Negative Binomial model is only applicable in the
presence of over-dispersion using the Poisson distribution, in which the variance is greater than
the mean; when there is under-dispersion using the Poisson distribution, the Negative Binomial
model is not valid (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995). As used by Shankar, Mannering
and Barfield (1995), the following equation represents the probability distribution using the
Negative Binomial model:
P(Yit) =

ሺఏାଢ଼౪ ሻ
ሺఏሻଢ଼౪ Ǩ

(୧୲ ఏ )(Yit)(1 - uit)

(5)

Where uit = ߠ/(ߠ + exp(xitߚ)), ߠ = 1/ߙ and Ȟሺሻ represents a function of gamma (Shankar,
Mannering and Barfield, 1995).
I will also implement the Generalized Negative Binomial model in which the form of the
variance is not assumed to be linear, as it is in the Negative Binomial model. Thus, the
Generalized Negative Binomial model makes my results more precise as the form of the variance
is not assumed to be linear.
In my regression, I specify the following model:
E(Accidentsit) = Departuresit * exp(Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1Budget Airlineit + Ⱦ2Average Stage
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(6)

Lengthit + uit)
Consistent with existing research, the expected number of accidents is the number of
departures multiplied by the average accident rate per departure because of the stochastic or
random nature of accident data (Wang, Hofer and Dresner, 2013; Rose, 1990).
Based on equation 6, my hypothesis that budget airlines are less safe is supported when
ߚ 1 > 0. When an airline is considered to be a budget airline and ߚ 1 is positive, there is a positive
effect on the expected value of accidents and thus my hypothesis is supported. My hypothesis
that an increase in average flight length leads to a decrease in accidents is supported when ߚ 2 <
0, as an increase in the average stage length should be negatively related to the number of
accidents, according to my prediction.

IV.

Data
I use data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) as has been used in
previous research. To minimize measurement errors, I make use of a consolidated data set from
the Airline Data Project at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which contains data
from the BTS form 41 which gathers quarterly billing data and monthly airline data. Using these
data sources, I construct a panel data set which varies across fifteen U.S. airlines over twenty-one
years, from 1995 through 2015. Data on all fifteen airlines in the MIT project is included; a list
of these airlines along with the years for which data is available for each airline can be found in
table 1 of section VIII.
Due to mergers and acquisitions within the industry, there is no data for all twenty-one
years for all fifteen airlines. It is important to note that while this is considered “missing data” in
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terms of the raw data, the data is not in fact missing as the airlines simply were not in existence
or operating during the years in which I do not have data. I have verified with individual airline
websites that the years in which there is “missing data” align with mergers, acquisitions, entries
or closings within the industry. Because of these gaps in the data, together with the fact that my
panel is relatively narrow in the sense that I only include data on fifteen airlines, I continue my
analysis by treating my panel data set as cross sectional data as done by Golbe (1986).9
I use a dependent variable of aircraft accidents as used by Golbe (1986) Borenstein and
Zimmerman (1988), and Rose (1990) and Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013). I have gathered the
information from the FAA which has the NTSB’s Accident and Incident Database. According to
the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), an aircraft accident is
defined as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft
receives substantial damage” (ASIAS). I have included all U.S. aircraft accidents, including fatal
and non-fatal, from January 1995 through December 2015 for all fifteen airlines used in my
dataset. Due to the nature of aircraft accidents, this variable is a non-continuous, discrete count
variable.
In order to answer my question regarding the effect of flight length on accident
propensity, my primary independent variable of interest is average stage length which is used by
Golbe (1986), Rose (1990) and Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2012). This variable is available in the
consolidated MIT study, which pulls data from the BTS form 41, and measures the total number
9
I report results using fixed effects in tables 9 and 10 of section VIII. While the signs of the
average stage length and budget airline variable coefficients are the same when implementing
cross sectional data methods, neither coefficient is statistically significant at even the 10%
significance level.
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of miles flown divided by the total number of departures. Thus, the average stage length
represents average flight length of each departure, measured in miles.
In order to answer my question regarding the effect of being a budget airline on accident
propensity, I have investigated three potential independent variables including a dummy
variable, total baggage fee and total cancelation fee. Based on the research of Garrow, Holte and
Mumbower (2011), who study the phenomena of product de-bundling in the airline industry, I
have created a binary variable valued at 1, which is attributed to a budget or low-cost carrier and
0, which is attributed to a non-budget or legacy airline. Their research includes a total of eleven
U.S. airlines, ten of which I also include in my data set. Although Garrow, Holte and Mumbower
(2011) do not precisely define budget or legacy carriers, they state that the legacy carriers
“participate in well-established alliances that enable them to further increase the number of
destinations they can serve; these major carriers also tend to have a moderate number of other
airline partners that further enhance their networks” (Garrow, Holte and Mumbower, 2011).
Based on their classification of low cost carriers, I identify the following same four budget
airlines: Southwest, AirTran, JetBlue and Frontier.10 I classify the remaining eleven airlines in
my data set as legacy or non-budget airlines, six of which are also considered to be legacy
carriers by Garrow, Holte and Mumbower (2011). Thus, I assume that the five airlines included
in my data set, but not included in the specific reference literature, are also legacy carriers.
I have also included total baggage fees and total cancelation fees as potential key
independent variables to account for budget airlines. I have gathered both fee variables from the
consolidated MIT study, both of which are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. I use the
10
In conducting further company research, I find both Allegiant Air and Sprit to be considered
budget airlines. While I do not include these classifications in my primary results, tables 11 and
12 in section VIII show the results of my research with additionally categorizing both Allegiant
Air and Spirt as budget airlines.
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conclusion of Garrow, Holte and Mumbower’s (2011) research that budget airlines are the most
likely to charge additional ancillary fees. Thus, I use the fee variables, interchangeably, as proxy
variables to represent an airline behaving “more like a budget airline.” I assume that a 1-unit
increase in either fee variable indicates an airline behaving more like a budget airline. However,
due to structural breaks and variation across low-cost carriers, as mentioned by Garrow, Holte
and Mumbower (2011), there is potential bias in the way these fee variables may represent
budget airlines. Due to the difficulty in defining a budget airline precisely, as shown in previous
research, I include all three variables (baggage fee, cancelation fee, budget airline) to
interchangeably account for budget airlines.
I use the number of incidents reported for each airline in each year, from the FAA ASIAS
as done by Rose (1990). An incident is defined as “an occurrence other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of
operations” (ASIAS). Due to the nature of aircraft incidents, this variable is a non-continuous,
discrete count variable. As I have not been able to include the average age of the aircraft, I
presume that incidents will work to control for age of aircraft-related characteristics, which may
affect accidents as an increase in incidents intuitively leads to an increase in the probability of an
accident.
The following control variables that I mention are all gathered from the MIT project and
thus the BTS form 41. I control for size of aircraft by dividing average seat miles (ASM) by the
total number of miles flown. ASM is an industry standard measurement of utilization and airline
output and measures the total number of available seats per departure multiplied by the total
number of miles traveled. However, because ASM includes mileage, there is potential for
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collinearity with my independent variable of interest, average stage length. Thus, I divide ASM
by miles and am left with the average number of seats per departure.
I control for airline size by including the number of functioning aircraft and total
operating revenue measured in billions of U.S. dollars. I include the average salary of both pilots
and co-pilots, measured in U.S. dollars, to control for pilot experience and skill level. I include
maintenance per aircraft in which I divide the total maintenance expenditure, measured in
thousands of U.S. dollars, by the total number of aircraft in the fleet to account for maintenance
cost per aircraft. Summary statistics of all variables can be found in table 2 of section VIII.
While I attempt to create a robust data set including industry standard, intuitively sound
and previously used variables, I have not been able to collect data on average aircraft age and
airline profitability. Aircraft incidents may serve as a proxy variable for aircraft age while total
revenue may serve as a proxy variable for profitability, although neither fully capture the effect
of the absent variables.
V.

Results
I present my basic Poisson regressions in table 3 of section VIII. In running the most

simplified regression presented in column 1, the sign of the coefficient of interest in positive and
statistically significant at the 99% level. When I include control variables to the same model, as
seen in columns 2 and 3 of table 3, the estimated coefficient of the average stage length variable
becomes negative while remaining statistically significant. The results in column 1 indicate that a
1-unit increase in flight length leads to a 0.059% increase in the number of accidents while the
results in columns 2 and 3 indicate that a 1-unit increase in average stage length leads to a 0.10%
decrease in the number of accidents, which are all statistically significant at the 99% confidence
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level. Further, seen in the regressions in columns 2 and 3 of table 3, when an airline is a budget
airline the number of accidents decreases by 61.74% and 61.41%, respectively.11
Based on the regression represented in column 3 of table 3 in section VIII, I run both
Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit tests. With P-values of 0.0017 and 0.0005, respectively, I
reject the null hypothesis that the Poisson model fits my relationship of interest well.
The regressions in table 5 utilize the Negative Binomial model. The basic regression in
column 1 indicates that a 1-unit increase in the average flight length leads to a 0.07% increase in
the number of accidents which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This
positive sign of the coefficient is similar to that of the basic regression using the Poisson model
shown in column 1 of table 3. When I implement the Negative Binomial model and run the LR
test of alpha = 0, I get a P-value of 0.000. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis that alpha is equal to
zero and conclude the Negative Binomial model to be a good fit for my data as I find overdispersion and cannot assume the variance of accidents to be equal to the mean or for alpha to be
equal to 0.12
When I include control variables to the basic Negative Binomial model, as seen in
columns 2-5 of table 5, the estimated coefficient of the average stage length variable becomes
negative. The difference between the regressions represented in columns 2-4 is the variable in
which I use to account for budget airline. In column 2 of table 5, I include the baggage fee
variable while in column 3 of table 5, I include the cancelation fee variable. Intuitively I expect
an increase in baggage or cancelation fees to lead to an increase in the number of accidents, as I
assume that airlines that charge higher fees behave more similarly to budget airlines. From the
11
The output in table 4 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Poisson regressions represented in table 3.
12
Further, because the mean of accidents is 1.28 while the variance is 3.43, I can simply identify
the presence of over-dispersion within my data.
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regression output seen in columns 2 and 3, neither estimated coefficient of the baggage nor
cancelation fee variable is statistically significant at even the 90% confidence level. Due to the
insignificance of the estimated coefficients, structural breaks and potential measurement error, I
conclude that neither baggage nor cancelation fees accurately represent budget airlines.13
The regressions represented in columns 4 and 5 of table 5 include a binary budget airline
variable as opposed to a fee variable to account for budget airlines. Both regressions show that a
1-unit increase in the average stage length leads to 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents,
which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The estimated coefficients of the
budget airline variable are large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 99% level; I find
that when an airline is a budget airline, the number of accidents decreases by 71.84% and
79.16%. It is worth noting the changes in significance of the estimated coefficients of the
average stage length, maintenance per aircraft, number of seats and incidents variables from
column 3 to column 4.14 The large magnitude of the budget airline coefficients in columns 4 and
5 may be explained by the measurement error in the variable and thus I am not confident in these
conclusions drawn to answer my question regarding the effect of budget airlines on accident
propensity.
The regressions represented in table 7 are the same as those presented in table 5, although
they implement the Generalized Negative Binomial model as opposed to the Negative Binomial
model. The results are almost identical to those of the Negative Binomial model but because the
generalized model even further loosens the assumptions of the variance structure, I have decided
13
The output in table 6 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Negative Binomial regressions represented in table 5.
14
In line with previous literature, I also run these regressions with an added time trend variable
in order to account for advances in technology over time which may decrease accident
propensity. However, because the estimated coefficient of the time trend variable is consistently
statistically insignificant, I do not include it in my final results.
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to treat the regression in column 5 of table 7 as my final regression. As some of the estimated
coefficients in the regression represented in column 4 of table 7 are not statistically significant at
even the 90% confidence level, I run the regression in column 5 of table 7 in order to more
accurately estimate the coefficients of interest.
From the regression output represented in column 5 of table 7, I have statistically
significant evidence at the 1% significance level that a 1-unit increase in average stage length
leads to a 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents while I have statistically significant
evidence at the 1% significance level that when an airline is classified as being a budget airline,
the number of accidents decreases by 79.16%. All of the signs of the estimated coefficients align
with intuition.15
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the average stage length variable
does not align with the research of Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) nor Rose (1990), who both
find statistically significant positive coefficient estimates.16 However, the negative sign of the
average stage length coefficient does align with the findings of Golbe (1986) though she does not
find the negative average stage length coefficients to be statistically significant at any level.

VI.

Conclusion
From the previous section, I conclude that there is statistically significant evidence at the

1% significance level that a 1-unit increase in average stage length leads to a 0.11% decrease in
15
The output in table 8 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Negative Binomial regressions represented in table 7. Column 5 of table 8 in section
VIII represents the marginal effects corresponding to my final regression in which a 1-unit
increase in average flight length is associated with 0.00093 fewer accidents and an airline being a
budget carrier is associated with 0.57 fewer accidents.
16
Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) find statistically significant evidence at the 1% level that
“longer stage lengths are associated with a higher accident propensity” (Wang, Hofer and
Dresner, 2013).
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the number of aircraft accident. I have statistically significant evidence at the 1% significance
level that when an airline is a budget airline, the expected value of an accident decreases by
79.16%.
As stated in section III, I hypothesize that an increase in the average stage length leads to
a decrease in the number of accidents as operators who provide short-haul services incur more
takeoffs and landings, which put the engines and aircraft under the most stress. Based on the
negative sign of the coefficient of the average stage length variable, this hypothesis is supported.
I also hypothesize the number of accidents increases when an airline is a budget airline as budget
airlines may spend less on safety in order to provide comparable services to non-budget airlines.
However, due to the negative sign of the estimated coefficient of the binary budget airline
variable, my hypothesis relating to budget airlines is not supported.
Intuitively the negative and statistically significant, at the 99% level, coefficients of both
independent variables of interest may be explained by airline business decisions. Based on my
results, an increase in average flight length leads to a decrease in the number of accidents. This
may mean that carriers that provide longer flights put more resources toward flight safety as
opposed to carriers which provide flights with shorter average stage lengths.17 After further
investigating the specific position of each accident during the flight, I find that 30.58% of
accidents occur while the aircraft is on the ground, 16.25% of accidents occur while at cruising
level, 44.35% occur during either takeoff or landing and 8.82% of accidents occur with an
“other” or undefined reason. Thus, it makes sense that short-haul carriers, that experience a
larger number of takeoffs and landings, have more accidents as 44.35% of accidents occur at
17
In testing the effect of average stage length on maintenance expenditure per aircraft, I find
statistically significant evidence that a 1-unit increase in flight length leads to an increase in
maintenance expenditure per aircraft. Thus I conclude that longer-haul carriers have higher
expenditure on maintenance per aircraft than that of their counterparts.
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takeoff and landing. Conversely, it makes sense that airlines that provide longer flight lengths
have fewer takeoffs and landings than their short-haul provider counterparts and thus incur a
smaller number of accidents. These results indicate that airlines that provides longer-haul flights
have inherently different operating methods and flight safety structures than those of shorter-haul
carriers.
Based on the results, when an airline is a budget airline, the number of accidents
decreases by an extremely large magnitude. Although these results may support the idea that
budget airlines may be sensitive to an unsafe reputation and thus may allocate more resources
toward safety than that of their counterparts in order to maintain strong reputations of safety,
after further investigation I find, this is not the case.18 While these results indicate that budget
airlines have different safety structures than that of non-budget or legacy airlines I am not
confident in my results regarding the budget airline variable. The unrealistically large coefficient
signifies an error within the application. I suspect measurement error of the budget airline
variable to be a large potential issue within my model which leaves me with little confidence in
my results associated to the budget airline variable.19
Ultimately these results indicate that a homogenous airline regulation framework is not
appropriate for budget nor long-haul airlines. With statistically significant evidence that both an
increase in average flight length and an airline being a budget airline lead to a decrease in the
number of aircraft accidents, it is apparent that not all airlines should be held to identical

18

In further investigation, I find statistically significant evidence at the 1% level that budget
airlines spend less on maintenance per aircraft than non-budget airlines.
19
It is worth noting that in testing the difference between accident rates of budget and nonbudget airlines, I find the mean of accidents for budget airlines to be .8133 while that of nonbudget airlines is 1.45. Thus my regression results and conclusions align with the variable within
my data set; thus I assume there to me measurement error within the variable and an “outside”
factor affecting the large decrease in accident rate of budget airlines.
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benchmarks. Airline business decisions have shown to significantly affect aircraft accident rates;
thus airlines should be regulated and upheld to specific standards based on these decisions.
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VIII.

Supporting Tables

Table 1: Airlines included in the Analysis and Available Observations for Each Airline
Airline

Available Data (Inclusive)

AirTran Airways

1995 - 2011

Alaska Airlines

1995 - 2015

Allegiant Air

2000 - 2015

America West Airlines

1995 - 2007

American Airlines

1995 - 2015

Continental Airlines

1995 - 2011

Delta Air Lines

1995 - 2015

Frontier Airlines

1995 - 2015

Hawaiian Airlines

1995 - 2015

JetBlue Airways

2000 - 2015

Northwest Airlines

1995 - 2009

Southwest Airlines

1995 - 2015

Spirit Airlines

1995 - 2015

United Airlines

1995 - 2015

US Airways

1995 - 2014
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Units

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of
Accidents

Count

283

1.282686

1.852146

0

9

Average Stage
Length

Total Miles
Flown / Aircraft
Departures

282

935.0396

278.6823

256.0417

1720.326

Budget Airline

Binary

282

.2659574

.4426272

0

1

Baggage Fee

Thousand U.S. $

252

108026.3

198955.6

20.54

1125846

Cancelation Fee

Thousand U.S. $

237

267122.2

460147.5

2690.4

3117848

Count

282

265.3815

235.9029

.9863014

971.8904

Airline

Number of
Aircraft in Fleet
Pilot and CoPilot Average
Salary

U.S. $

260

130379.8

113164.9

16694.64

1859096

Maintenance Per
Aircraft

Maintenance
Expenditure
($1,000)/ Fleet
Size

264

2420.938

996.9043

428.5007

5586.672

Total Revenue

Billion U.S. $

274

8.340641

9.127099

.0536117

41.08443

Number of
Incidents

Count

287

8.355401

10.39193

0

58

Number of Seats

ASM / Miles

282

160.6285

32.88094

93.34768

265.6832
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Table 3: Poisson Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

Average Stage
Length

.0005898
(.0001858)***

-.0010085
(.0003297)***

-.001009
(.0002927)***

Budget
Airline

-.6174235
(.2218317)***

-.6140813
(.1752401)***

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002912
(.0001192)**

-.0003702
(.000085)***

Fleet Size

.0041103
(.0006356)***

.0042339
(.0003065)***

Pilot Salary

-9.72e-07
(1.41e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0036111
(.0041183)

Number of
Incidents

.0033688
(.0055896)

Total Revenue

.0030551
(.0154579)

Intercept

-.3181392
(.1898117)*

1.181443
(.7035263)*

.6731913
(.2754536)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0095

0.3019

0.3031

Chi Squared

9.96

222.40

216.34

Number of
Observations

282

260

264

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 4: Poisson Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents

Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

Average Stage
Length

.0007448
(.00023)***

-.0008845
(.00029)***

-.0008721
(.00025)***

Budget

-.4748103
(.1541)***

-.4656173
(.12154)***

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002553
(.0001)**

-.00032
(.00007)***

Fleet Size

.0036048
(.00055)***

.0036592
(.00023)***

Pilot Salary

-8.53e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.003167
(.0036)

Number of
Incidents

.0029544
(.0049)

Total Revenue

.0026794
(.01355)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average
Stage Length

.0007184
(.0003591)**

-.0005928
(.0002924)**

-.0006922
(.0003893)*

-.0011078
(.000349)***

-.0011111
(.0003296)***

-.7184402
(.2333835)***

-.7916491
(.2245004)***

Budget
Airline
7.40e-07
(7.01e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

3.28e-07
(2.61e-07)

Maintenance
/ Aircraft

-.0002036
(.000133)

-.0000663
(.0001418)

-.0002223
(.0001257)*

-.0002559
(.0001094)**

Fleet Size

.0044434
(.0009075)***

.0042938
(.0010027)***

.0042367
(.0006174)***

.0044162
(.0002986)***

Pilot Salary

-1.80e-06
(2.05e-06)

-3.28e-06
(2.90e-06)

-9.61e-07
(1.14e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0018323
(.0040688)

-.0036962
(.0043345)

-.0064759
(.0043613)*

Number of
Incidents

.0132486
(.0059269)***

.018139
(.0079114)***

.0037346
(.0058818)

Total
Revenue

-.0226676
(.0324717)

-.0210113
(.0333182)

.0033395
(.0155194)

-.0060738
(.0040212)

Intercept

-.441502
(.353355)

.2237119
(.6562952)

.4707563
(.663461)

1.538596
(.7558503)*

1.450162
(.6742874)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0046

0.1718

0.1676

0.1864

0.1865

Chi Squared

4.00

225.76

225.04

254.70

237.78

Number of
Observations

282

244

230

260

264

Notes: Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average
Stage Length

.0009044
(.00045)**

-.00056
(.00028)**

-.0005847
(.00033)*

-.0009521
(.0003)***

-.0009337
(.00027)***

-.5315556
(.15305)***

-.5652535
(.1409)***

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

6.99e-07
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

2.77e-07
(.00000)

Maintenance
/ Aircraft

-.0001924
(.00012)

-.000056
(.00012)

-.0001911
(.00011)*

-.0002151
(.00009)**

Fleet Size

.0041975
(.00086)***

.0036268
(.00083)***

.0036416
(.00054)***

.0037113
(.00024)***

Pilot Salary

-1.70e-06
(.00000)

-2.77e-06
(.00000)

-8.26e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.0017309
(.00385)

-.0031221
(.00365)

-.0055662
(.00374)

Number of
Incidents

.0125155
(.00569)**

.0153216
(.00691)**

.00321
(.00505)

Total
Revenue

-.0214132
(.03074)

-.0177477
(.02811)

.0028704
(.01333)

-.0051043
(.00338)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 7: Generalized Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

.0007184
(.0003591)**

-.0005928
(.0002924)**

-.0006922
(.0003893)*

-.0011078
(.000349)***

-.0011111
(.0003296)***

-.7184398
(.2333834)***

-.791649
(.2245004)***

Budget
Airline
7.40e-07
(7.01e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

3.28e-07
(2.61e-07)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002036
(.000133)

-.0000663
(.0001418)

-.0002223
(.0001257)*

-.0002559
(.0001094)**

Fleet Size

.0044434
(.0009075)***

.0042938
(.0010027)***

.0042367
(.0006174)***

.0044162
(.0002986)***

Pilot Salary

-1.80e-06
(2.05e-06)

-3.28e-06
(2.90e-06)

-9.61e-07
(1.14e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0018323
(.0040688)

-.0036962
(.0043345)

-.0064759
(.0043613)

Number of
Incidents

.0132486
(.0059269)***

.018139
(.0079114)***

.0037346
(.0058818)

Total Revenue

-.0226676
(.0324717)

-.0210113
(.0333182)

.0033396
(.0155194)

-.0060738
(.0040212)

Intercept

-.441502
(.353355)

.2237118
(.6562952)

.4707563
(.6634611)

1.538595
(.7558502)**

1.450162
(.6742874)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0046

0.1718

0.1676

0.1864

0.1865

Chi Squared

4.00

225.76

225.04

254.70

237.78

Number of
Observations

282

244

230

260

264

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 8: Generalized Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

.0009044
(.00045)**

-.00056
(.00028)**

-.0005847
(.00033)*

-.0009521
(.0003)***

-.0009337
(.00027)***

-.5315554
(.15305)***

-.5652534
(.1409)***

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

6.99e-07
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

2.77e-07
(.00000)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0001924
(.00012)

-.000056
(.00012)

-.0001911
(.00011)*

-.0002151
(.00009)**

Fleet Size

.0041975
(.00086)***

.0036268
(.00083)***

.0036416
(.00054)***

.0037113
(.00024)***

Pilot Salary

-1.70e-06
(.00000)

-2.77e-06
(.00000)

-8.26e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.0017309
(.00385)

-.0031221
(.00365)

-.0055662
(.00374)

Number of
Incidents

.0125155
(.00569)**

.0153216
(.00691)**

.00321
(.00505)

Total Revenue

-.0214132
(.03074)

-.0177477
(.02811)

.0028704
(.01333)

-.0051043
(.00338)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 9: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0007067
(.0003892)*

-.0003581
(.0007181)

-.0004855
(.0008489)

-.0003422
(.0007117)

-.0003761
(.0005644)

-1.015469
(1.756771)

-.9040006
(1.641604)

Budget
Airline
-8.00e-08
(5.60e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

1.46e-08
(2.23e-07)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0000784
(.0001749)

-.0000348
(.0001956)

-.0000821
(.0001694)

Fleet Size

.0037966
(.0012328)***

.003085
(.0014513)**

.0037115
(.0012205)***

.0037001
(.0010353)***

Pilot Salary

-3.46e-06
(3.21e-06)

-3.85e-06
(3.42e-06)

-3.75e-06
(3.15e-06)

-3.70e-06
(2.96e-06)

Number of
Seats

.0020996
(.0116373)

-.0105001
(.0135941)

Number of
Incidents

-.0015042
(.0092532)

-.0022328
(.0127798)

-.0006037
(.0114217)
-.0025023

Total Revenue

-.0198427
(.0286438)

-.007008
(.0293961)

(.0092082)
-.0216388
(.019868)

-.0233521
(.0160176)

Intercept

2.718387
(.7503188)***

1.644222
(1.989476)

3.955269
(2.439316)

2.48019
(2.208632)

2.162544
(1.235409)*

Chi Squared

3.30

18.97

15.87

19.70

19.52

Number of
Observations

282

238

230

260

260

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 10: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0007067
(.00039)*

-.0003581
(.00072)

-.0004855
(.00085)

-.0003422
(.00071)

-.0003761
(.00056)

-1.015469
(1.75677)

-.9040006
(1.6416)

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

-8.00e-08
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

1.46e-08
(.00000)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0000784
(.00017)

-.0000348
(.0002)

-.0000821
(.00017)

Fleet Size

.0037966
(.00123)***

.003085
(.00145)**

.0037115
(.00122)***

.0037001
(.00104)***

Pilot Salary

-3.46e-06
(.00000)

-3.85e-06
(.00000)

-3.75e-06
(.00000)

-3.70e-06
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

.0020996
(.01164)

-.0105001
(.01359)

-.0006037
(.01142)

Number of
Incidents

-.0015042
(.00925)

-.0022328
(.01278)

-.0025023
(.00921)

Total Revenue

-.0198427
(.02864)

-.007008
(.0294)

-.0216388
(.01987)

-.0233521
(.01602)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 11: Re-defined Budget Variable Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0011291
(.0003257)***

-.0011291
(.0003257)***

-.0010107
(.0003017)***

-.0003294
(.0007111)

-.0003649
(.000564)

Budget
Airline

-.9677346
(.2219163)***

-.9677344
(.2219163)***

-.955858
(.2032952)***

-.8518152
(1.811383)

-.7464848
(1.708464)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0003749
(.0001323)***

-.0003749
(.0001323)***

-.0003526
(.0001056)***

-.0000837
(.0001694)

Fleet Size

.0041583
(.0006001)***

.0041583
(.0006001)***

.0041529
(.0003086)***

.0037185
(.0012219)***

.0037109
(.0010365)***

Pilot Salary

-1.23e-06
(1.47e-06)

-1.23e-06
(1.47e-06)

-3.71e-06
(3.15e-06)

-3.68e-06
(2.96e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0054923
(.0040084)

-.0054923
(.0040084)

Number of
Incidents

-.0027056
(.0062859)

-.0027056
(.0062859)

-.0023595
(.0092196)

Total Revenue

.0050343
(.0151806)

.0050343
(.0151806)

-.0217331
(.0198984)

-.023557
(.0160326)

Intercept

1.987853
(.7174252)***

Type of
Regression

Negative
Binomial

1.987852
(.7174251)***
Generalized
Negative
Binomial

1.717778
(.6175659)***
Generalized
Negative
Binomial

2.392866
(2.194456)
Fixed Effects
Negative
Binomial

2.113079
(1.220386)*
Fixed Effects
Negative
Binomial

Robust
Standard
Errors?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Pseudo R2

0.1974

0.1974

0.1984

Chi Squared

265.39

265.39

263.31

19.53

19.39

Number of
Observations

260

260

264

260

260

-.0057792
(.0036146)

-.0003993
(.0114145)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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